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governance reforms necessary for successful 
stabilisation. Revisions of these strategies must 
reflect the principles of the New Deal, or they 
will continue to have little impact on the long-
term situation of insecurity and displacement.
In a region where the population and 
international community both have very low 
expectations of government officials, and 
the government itself makes little effort to 
change this, consecutive periods of internal 
forced migration can set back meaningful 
state-building. The Congolese government 
already demonstrates limited accountability to 
its people, and successive waves of displaced 
people may have exacerbated this, as the 
focus of both the population and international 
donors is on shorter-term humanitarian relief. 
Continuing displacement can magnify 
the international community’s tendency 
to replicate, side-line or take over the 
responsibilities of fragile governments, 
effectively letting them off the hook. 
Addressing the development needs of the 
people of North Kivu will require a great deal 
of time, commitment and political capital. 
In the end, the Congolese state must show 
will and build capacity not only to resolve 
and manage conflict amongst its population 
and end the causes of displacement but 
also to consistently improve services 
and lead humanitarian interventions to 
reinforce these services when needed. 
Luisa Ryan luisa_caitlin@hotmail.com is 
an independent consultant. Dominic Keyzer 
domkeyzer@gmail.com was Advocacy 
Manager for World Vision DRC, Eastern Region. 
www.worldvision.org
1. The aim of the study was to determine if a project called 
Community Voice and Action (CVA), successful in other African 
countries, could also be applied in the Kivus. CVA works with 
communities and local service providers (health, education and 
protection) to jointly evaluate their social infrastructure and 
advocate to local government for improvement.
Can Refugee Cessation be seen as a proxy for the 
end of state fragility?
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The cessation of refugee status results from a judgment that a sufficient change has  
occurred in the refugees’ country of origin that they no longer require international protection.  
For individual refugees this may leave them in a precarious situation. For states hoping  
to dispel an image of being economically, politically or socially ‘fragile’, this judgment is 
clearly very helpful. 
The voluntary repatriation of refugees to their 
country of origin is often interpreted by the 
international community as signalling the 
state’s ability to resume responsibility for its 
citizens. The formal invocation of a ‘ceased 
circumstances’ Cessation Clause formalises 
this interpretation in international law. 
It amounts to legal recognition, determined 
by Tripartite Agreements between countries 
of origin, countries of asylum and UNHCR, 
that ‘fundamental changes’ have occurred 
in the country of origin such that a refugee 
‘can no longer … continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of 
his nationality’.1 A Cessation Clause is thus 
understood as proof that profound, stable 
and durable changes have occurred since 
the time of the refugees’ departure such that 
the country of origin’s capacity to protect 
its citizens’ rights is once again restored.
A declaration of cessation is therefore of 
immense symbolic importance for fragile 
states. States recovering from conflict or 
civil strife can utilise the recognition of 
stability inherent within the invocation of a 
Cessation Clause to buttress the claim, for 






example, that displaced people no longer 
have any continuing need for protection 
either inside, or outside, the country.  
The case of Rwandan refugees
The 1994 genocide of Tutsi and moderate 
Hutu, and subsequent inter-communal and 
cross-border conflict, which purportedly 
reached its conclusion in 1998, resulted in 
over 3.2 million refugees fleeing the country. 
In several respects, Rwanda has remained 
an extremely fragile state ever since, despite 
some remarkable improvements in basic 
political and economic indicators since 
1994. The government nonetheless faces 
continuing criticism over its increasingly 
authoritarian style of governance, and 
concerns regularly focus on its restrictions 
on domestic freedom of speech and political 
association, its harassment and suppression 
of opposition parties, and the military’s 
aggressive and exploitative conduct within 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.  
Nevertheless, the possibility of invoking 
a Cessation Clause for Rwandan refugees 
has been under intense discussion since 
2000. By 2010 several countries had 
decided, in conjunction with UNHCR 
and the Government of Rwanda, that the 
refugee status of all Rwandans should 
be terminated by a generalised Cessation 
Clause. Following further debate between the 
involved parties and a chorus of protesting 
non-governmental organisations, it was 
decided that Cessation would be invoked in 
June 2013. This would, however, only apply 
to those Rwandan refugees who had fled 
between 1959 and 31st December 1998, as 
it was felt that the generalised conditions 
of violence that had resulted in Rwandan 
refugees fleeing the country up until 1999 no 
longer posed a threat to these individuals. 
These temporal limits have, however, 
been notably absent in the Government 
of Rwanda’s statements concerning the 
Cessation Clause. The government has 
asserted that it must be conforming to certain 
normative standards required for a positive 
assessment of its resumed protective role 
and capacity, using the Cessation Clause 
as ‘evidence’ of this improvement. The 
President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame, has 
repeatedly asserted that “eventually no 
Rwandan shall be called a refugee since 
there is no longer any reason for this”. 
Rwandans in exile thus seem convinced that 
the Cessation Clause, rather than reflecting a 
desire on the part of the state to re-assimilate 
Rwandan refugees, is being instrumentalised 
to bolster Rwanda’s international reputation. 
As the Rwandan state’s economic, and thus 
political, stability rests to a large extent on 
fluctuating relationships with increasingly 
disenchanted donor states – who have 
provided between 50 and 75 per cent of 
Rwanda’s national budget through foreign aid 
over the last fifteen years – the Government 
of Rwanda’s portrayal of cessation as 
indicative of full international endorsement 
of its behaviour is thus unsurprising. As a 
result, Rwandan refugees have experienced 
increasing constraints to the international 
recognition of their continuing protection 
needs. This may result in them experiencing 
further displacement, including back to 
situations of potential persecution.
Despite the Government of Rwanda’s 
assertions to the contrary, many Rwandans 
still face persecution and thus inevitably 
will continue to resist repatriation to a state 
that they do not trust to provide them with 
protection. Greater efforts therefore need to 
be made to prevent Cessation undermining 
the rights and on-going protection needs 
of Rwandan refugees. Through effective 
communication to clarify the exact details 
of the Cessation Clause, and the continuing 
accessibility of alternative durable solutions 
for those refugees who feel unable to return 
to Rwanda, Cessation could be invoked 
while minimising the negative outcomes.  
Georgia Cole georgia.cole@qeh.ox.ac.uk is 
studying for a DPhil at the University of Oxford. 
1. UNHCR, ‘The Cessation Clauses: Guidelines on Their 
Application’, 1999, www.refworld.org/docid/3c06138c4.html 
